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the rationale behind denying interlocutory appeals of certification orders
demands consistency.
Kathleen M. La Valle
State Taxation by the Apportionment Method Under the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses: Mobil Oil
Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes
Mobil Oil Corporation is an integrated petroleum business' organized
under the laws of the State of New York where it also has its principal
place of business and its commercial domicile. Mobil does business in
many states, as well as in a number of foreign countries, but its activities in
Vermont are limited to the wholesale and retail marketing of petroleum
products. The State of Vermont imposed a corporate net income tax2 on
Mobil's taxable income, calculated by means of a three-factor apportion-
ment formula.3 The taxable income included substantial amounts of for-
eign source4 dividends received from Mobil's subsidiaries and affiliates
doing business abroad. Challenging the tax on the grounds that it violated
1. Mobil Oil Corporation engages in exploration for petroleum reserves, production,
refining, transportation, and distribution and sale of petroleum and petroleum products.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 100 S. Ct. 1223, 1227, 63 L. Ed. 2d 510, 515
(1980).
2. The statute provides: "'Vermont net income' means, for any taxable year and for
any corporate taxpayer, the taxable income of the taxpayer for that taxable year under the
laws of the United States, excluding income which under the laws of the United States is
exempt from taxation by the states." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811(18) (Supp. 1980).
3. The statute provides:
If the income of a taxable corporation is derived from any trade, business or
activity conducted both within and without this state, the amount of the cor-
poration's Vermont net income which shall be apportioned to this state, so as
to allocate to this state a fair and equitable portion of that income, shall be
determined by multiplying that Vermont net income by the arithmetic average
of the following factors:
(1) The average of the value of all the real and tangible property within this
state (A) at the beginning of the taxable year and (B) at the end of the taxable
year . . . , expressed as a percentage of all such property both within and
without this state;
(2) The total wages, salaries, and other personal service compensation paid
during the taxable year to employees within this state, expressed as a percent-
age of all such compensation paid whether within or without this state;
(3) The gross sales, or charges for services performed, within this state, ex-
pressed as a percentage of such sales or charges whether within or without this
state.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833(a) (1970 & Supp. 1980).
4. The term "foreign" operations, as used in this Note, refers to a corporation orga-
nized under the laws of a foreign country, and "domestic" operations refers to a corporation
organized under the laws of one of the states. Brief for Appellant at 4 n.3.
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the due process5 and commerce clauses6 of the United States Constitution,
Mobil petitioned the Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont for modification
of the apportionment.7 Objecting to the inclusion of foreign source divi-
dend income in the preapportionment tax base,8 Mobil argued that this
income should be deducted from taxable income before apportionment
and allocated to New York, the state of its commercial domicile. The
commissioner rejected Mobil's due process and commerce clause argu-
ments and decided that the Vermont statute required inclusion of the for-
eign source dividend income in the tax base. The state superior court
reversed the commissioner's ruling,9 and the commissioner appealed.
Holding that the tax was constitutional, the Supreme Court of Vermont
reversed the superior court.' 0 Because of the substantial federal question
involved, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. I I
Held, affirmed: Vermont's inclusion in the preapportionment tax base of
dividend income from affiliates and subsidiaries doing business abroad vi-
olates neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 100 S. Ct. 1223, 63 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1980).
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE TAXATION UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSES
A. The Due Process Clause and Apportionment Formulas
The due process clause precludes a state from taxing income earned
outside that state.' 2 When a state seeks to tax the intrastate earnings of a
5. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States .... " Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833(b) (1970 & Supp. 1980) provides for a procedure for
modification of the apportionment.
8. Mobil did not challenge the accuracy or fairness of the apportionment formula. Its
sole contention was that Vermont lacked jurisdiction under the Constitution to include the
dividend income in the preapportionment tax base. Brief for Appellant at 11.
9. The superior court held that inclusion of the dividend income in the tax base sub-
jected Mobil to multiple taxation prohibited by the commerce clause because New York, the
state of Mobil's commercial domicile, could tax the dividends in full without apportionment.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, No. c 13-74 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 10, 1977).
10. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 545, 394 A.2d 1147 (1978). The
court found a sufficient nexus between Mobil and the State of Vermont to justify an appor-
tioned tax on both Mobil's operating and dividend income. The multiple taxation theory
relied on by the superior court was rejected because Mobil failed to prove that multiple
taxation would actually ensue; New York had not taxed Mobil's dividend income for the tax
years in question. For a discussion of the development of the multiple taxation doctrine, see
J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 242-44 (4th ed. 1978).
11. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 441 U.S. 941 (1979).
12. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968). "[A] State is
not entitled to tax tangible or intangible property that is unconnected with the State ....
The taxation of property not located in the taxing State is constitutionally invalid ... be-
cause it. . . denies to the taxpayer the process that is his due." Id at 324-25. "So far as due
process is concerned the only question is whether the tax in practical operation has relation
to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State." Id at 325
n.5. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
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business that operates in more than one state, it may examine the extra-
state earnings of that business only because specifically allocating profits
earned within the borders of the taxing state is virtually impossible. 13 Al-
though imperfect, an apportionment formula 14 has been accepted by the
United States Supreme Court as a method of measuring intrastate earn-
ings 15 so long as the formula meets two due process requirements. First,
there must be some minimal connection, or nexus, between the activities
taxed and the taxing state. 16 If a corporation avails itself of the privilege of
conducting business within a state, the nexus is established with that
state.' 7 Secondly, there must be a rational relation between the income
attributed to the taxing state and the intrastate activities actually under-
taken within that state. 18 According to this test, the apportioned tax will
be invalid only if it is out of proportion to the activities actually conducted
within the taxing state.19
These requirements may be met notwithstanding the fact that specific
income is determined to be extrastate through the use of separate geo-
graphical accounting, so long as the intrastate and extrastate activities
form part of a unitary business. 20 A business is unitary if its operation
within the taxing state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of
the business outside the state.21 A particular accounting system, although
a useful business tool, may not accurately reflect the amount of income
13. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920).
14. Under the apportionment method of taxation, the activities within the state are con-
sidered to be an inseparable part of a business that engages in activities both within and
without the taxing state. The net income of the business as a whole is determined as defined
by the state statute. The state then taxes only the portion of net income attributable to the
state by application of a three-factor apportionment formula. To determine that portion, net
income is multiplied by a fraction that represents the arithmetic average of the ratios of
sales, property, and payroll values within the state to those values of the business as a whole.
See generally J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10; Keesling & Warren, The
Unitary Concept in theAllocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42 (1960). For a background
discussion of and current use of apportionment formulas, see TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON BUSINESS 67-97 (1965); Peckron, Apportionment Factors Em-
ployed by States in the Computation of Corporate Income Tax, 3 J. CORP. TAX. 388 (1977).
15. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
16. "[Tlhe Constitution requires 'some definite link, some minimum connection, be-
tween a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.'" National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
17. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
18. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Mis-
souri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968).
19. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
20. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109, 2118-21,65 L. Ed.
2d 66, 78-82 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'r, 266 U.S. 271, 282-83 (1924).
21. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 281 N.W.2d 94, 100(1979) (quoting G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
101 (2d ed. 1950)). It appears that the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly
defined a unitary business, relying instead on the state court's definition. See Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109, 65 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1980). For a discussion of
the various tests used by the state courts, see Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income
Taxation of Multistate-Multinational Businesses, 10 URn. LAW. 181 (1978).
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earned within the taxing state.22 Most states use apportionment formulas
to deal with this problem. 23 These formulas are designed to produce only
a rough approximation of intrastate earnings, and ordinarily will not gen-
erate a figure that represents the income actually earned within the taxing
state.24 If the formula is "fairly calculated" to allocate to the state a por-
tion of net income "reasonably attributable" to the activities conducted
within the state, 25 due process requirements are satisfied. 26
The unitary business principle is the controlling element of apportion-
ability for purposes of state taxation of income earned by a business oper-
ating in interstate commerce. 27 A state is justified in attributing to itself a
proportionate amount of the profits earned by a company that carries on a
unitary business partly within and partly without that state. 28 The unitary
business principle was initially developed in a situation involving a single
corporation operating in interstate commerce through various branches or
divisions.29 Although various state court decisions later extended this
22. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942). Butler Bros., a wholesale mer-
chandise corporation, operated stores in several states, including California. Although the
corporation showed a substantial profit in 1935, the California store, using a separate ac-
counting basis, showed a loss. The Court held that the accounting system was not binding
on California in determining the amount of income attributable to the state. Id. at 507-08.
23. Forty-five out of the 46 states, including the District of Columbia, that impose cor-
porate net income taxes have adopted the three-factor apportionment formula, consisting of
property, payroll, and receipts. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-92 (1964). See also H.R. REP.
No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1121 .(1965); H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 607
(1965).
24. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
25. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506 (1942).
26. Id. at 506-07; see Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271
(1924) (Court allowed part of the overall net profits of the corporation to be attributed to the
state even though the activities in the taxing state were operated at a loss).
27. When a business conducts activities within the taxing state that are truly separate
and distinct from the activities conducted outside the state, the income and expenses attribu-
table to the taxing state can be determined easily and accurately. When the activities are an
inseparable part of a business carried on both within and without the state, however, such
determinations become extremely difficult. Although segregated figures can be computed,
they will necessarily reflect numerous arbitrary assumptions. Thus, the business should be
treated as a unit, net income from the entire business computed, and the share attributable
to the taxing state determined by an appropriate apportionment formula. Keesling & War-
ren, supra note 14, at 44-45. For further discussion of this concept, see Dexter, supra note
21; Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept andAffili-
ated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171 (1970); Wood, The Unitary Tax Controversy, 25
CAN. TAX J. 271 (1977).
28. Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924). Plaintiff, a
British corporation, manufactured and sold ale in Great Britain. In addition, a small
amount of ale was sold in New York. New York imposed an apportioned franchise tax on
the corporation's total net income. The Court sustained the tax, holding that the brewer
carried on a unitary business involving "a series of transactions beginning with the manufac-
ture in England and ending in sales in New York and other places--the process of manufac-
turing resulting in no profits until it ends in sales." Id. at 282.
29. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920). Underwood, a
Delaware corporation, was engaged in manufacturing and selling typewriters and supplies.
All of the corporation's products were manufactured in Connecticut, but most of its sales
were made from branch offices in other states. The Court sustained the validity of Connecti-
cut's tax on the apportioned amount of the corporation's entire net income. Id. at 120-21.
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principle to include multistate enterprises operating through a mul-
ticorporate structure,30 the United States Supreme Court has not addressed
this issue. To exclude income from apportionment, the taxpayer must
show by clear and cogent evidence that the income is earned from a sepa-
rate and distinct business operating outside the taxing state, and not from a
unitary business that conducts some activities within that state.3'
B. The Commerce Clause and State Taxation of Interstate Businesses
In addition to the due process clause, the courts generally rely on the
commerce clause in analyzing and resolving disputes arising out of state
taxation of multistate businesses. 32 Early Supreme Court decisions inter-
preted the commerce clause to prohibit direct state taxation of wholly in-
terstate commerce,33 thereby creating a tax-haven for corporations
involved exclusively in interstate business. 34 The Court abandoned that
interpretation in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,35 holding that
the commerce clause was not intended to relieve businesses operating in
interstate commerce from bearing their just share of the state tax burden. 36
Finally, in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 37 the
Court explicitly stated that the commerce clause does not prohibit a state
from levying a fairly apportioned net income tax on a foreign corporation
engaged exclusively in interstate business.38
30. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 176 P.2d 697 (Cal.), rev'd on rehearing, 30
Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947); Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 237 Or. 261, 391
P.2d 601 (1964); Interstate Fin. Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 28 Wis. 2d 262, 137
N.W.2d 38 (1965). Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical
Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 346 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein, State Taxa-
tion]. "This was a sensible, and indeed, an essential step, since the unitary business appor-
tionment concept is based on an economic approach that ought not be avoided by the
technical niceties of legal distinctions between controlled subsidiaries and divisions or
branches." Id. at 346. For further discussion, see Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State
Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1968).
31. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942). See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
32. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Department of
Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
33. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
34. See Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 30, at 337.
35. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
36. Id. at 254-58. The Western Live Stock opinion introduced the multiple taxation
doctrine, under which a state tax imposed on businesses operating in interstate commerce
would only be invalidated if it subjected interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation.
Id See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 348
(1944).
37. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
38. The decision in Northwestern States triggered the first congressional action regard-
ing state taxation powers under the commerce clause in 170 years. Congress enacted Pub. L.
No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555-56 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976)), which led to congres-
sional committee studies and recommendations concerning the overall problems of state
taxation of interstate commerce. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, supra note 23. These studies and recommendations encouraged many proposed
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In several recent cases the Court has attempted to clarify the effect of the
commerce clause on state taxation of businesses operating in interstate
commerce.39 As a result of these decisions, the Court has established a
method of determining the constitutionality of a state tax by examining the
practical effect of the tax in relation to four factors: the tax must (1) be
levied on activities that have a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)
be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce in
favor of local commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services and pro-
tection conferred upon the taxpayer by the state.40
One of the most vexing problems involving the effect of the commerce
clause on state taxation of interstate commerce is the determination of the
constitutional implications of attributing income earned from intangible
property interests, 4 1 such as dividend income, to a state for purposes of
taxation. The Supreme Court has refused to hold that either the commerce
clause or the due process clause requires allocation of income from in-
measures to establish uniform federal restrictions on state taxation of interstate commerce.
To date, none have been enacted. See Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 30, at 340.
Two legislative proposals providing limitations on state taxation of interstate and foreign
source dividend income were introduced during the first session of the current United States
Senate. S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S11657 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979); S.
983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S4458 (daily ed. April 23, 1979). While the
scope of S. 1688 is limited to the restriction of state taxation of foreign source income, S. 983
additionally establishes uniform national standards governing state taxation of interstate
commerce. In regard to state taxation of foreign source income, the restrictions of S. 1688
are limited to foreign source dividends, whereas S. 983 would apply to foreign source in-
come in general. In further contrast, S. 983 established a broad prohibition on state taxation
of foreign source income by providing that foreign source income may not be apportioned or
allocated to any state, while S. 1688 allows state taxation of foreign source dividend income,
but requires that a certain portion of those dividends be excluded from a state's tax base.
The non-excluded portion would be subject to state taxation. In applying a state income tax
to a corporation, states would be prohibited by S. 1688 from taxing the income of any for-
eign affiliates.
In regard to state taxation of interstate income, the primary emphasis of S. 983 is twofold.
First, the proposal restricts the power of a state to tax interstate transactions by requiring
that certain minimum contacts exist between a state and a seller or purchaser before the state
can impose a sales, use, or gross receipts tax. Secondly, the proposal attempts to alleviate the
problem of over or under-allocation of multistate income to a particular state by requiring
that the states employ a uniform formula for apportioning such income. The uniform
formula would apportion income on the basis of three factors: sales, payroll, and property.
The Senate Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management generally concluded pub-
lic hearings on S. 983 and S. 1688 on June 24, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. D950 (daily ed. June
24, 1980).
39. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 431 (1979) (additional factors
must be considered when a state attempts to tax instrumentalities of foreign commerce);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (commerce clause does not prohibit any
overlap in the computation of taxable income by the states); Department of Revenue v.
Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (state tax burden impermissibly
impedes interstate commerce only when it unfairly burdens commerce by exacting more
than its just share of the cost of state government).
40. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1979) (quoting
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
41. Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corpora-
tions, 29 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1976). Multinational and multistate businesses are strongly
opposed to the trend that has developed to treat income from intangibles as apportionable
income. Instead, these businesses insist that such income should be allocated to a single
state for taxation purposes. Id. at 401-02.
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tangibles to a single state.42 In Curry v. McCanless 4 3 the Court dispensed
with the fiction that an intangible has a location and is taxable only by the
state in which it is located. 44 Because the owner derives benefits and pro-
tection from the state in which the intangible is used, the Court concluded
that the income is taxable by that state. 45 The Court stressed, however,
that the power to tax the income from an intangible is not exclusive if
other states also provide benefits and protection for the intangible.
46
II. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION V. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES
In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction to determine whether the Constitution prohib-
its state taxation by the apportionment method of income earned from in-
vestments in affiliates and subsidiaries operating abroad.47 Expanding the
scope of the unitary business principle to include foreign subsidiaries and
affiliates,48 the Court held that neither the due process clause nor the com-
merce clause prohibits taxation of such income by apportionment. 49 In-
come is immune from apportionment, under the due process clause, if it
lacks a sufficient nexus with the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state, or
bears no rational relation to the taxpayer's activities within the state.50
Mobil argued that a sufficient nexus did not exist between its activities in
Vermont and the dividend income received from its foreign subsidiaries.5'
In determining whether the nature of the income in question precluded a
finding of the requisite nexus, the Court examined two factors.5 2 First, the
Court considered the foreign source of the income. In Butler Brothers v.
McColgan53 the Court had previously held that even though the source of
42. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
43. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
44. Id. at 367. The decedent, domiciled in Tennessee, transferred stocks and bonds to a
trustee in Alabama where the trust was administered until her death. Both states claimed
the right to tax the transfer, each claiming to be the situs of the transaction. The Court held
that each state could constitutionally impose a tax because the taxpayer had received the
benefit and protection of the laws of both states. The Court stated that "when the taxpayer
extends his activities with respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection
and benefit of the laws of another state," there is no reason for a single place of taxation. 1d.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 372-73.
47. 441 U.S. 941 (1979).
48. The authors of one book have suggested:
In recent years a controversy has developed as to the propriety of applying
unitary apportionment principles to foreign operations. On the merits, unitary
apportionment may become a questionable yardstick as a fair measure of a
State's share of the earnings of an enterprise, when it is extended world-wide.
Some companies may earn considerably higher rates of profit abroad than in
the United States; relative ratios of property, payroll and receipts may be an
extremely crude method of ascribing profits actually earned in the various
countries.
J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, at 538.
49. 100 S. Ct. at 1237, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 528.
50. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
51. 100 S. Ct. at 1230-31, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 520-21.
52. Id. at 1231, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 521.
53. 315 U.S. 501 (1942). See a/so note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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the income can be established as extrastate, apportionability is not pre-
cluded if the intrastate and extrastate activities form part of a single uni-
tary business.54 Mobil had the burden of proving by clear and cogent
evidence that the foreign operations of the dividend-paying affiliates and
subsidiaries were not part of its unitary petroleum business that conducted
some of its activities in Vermont.." Mobil offered no evidence to meet that
burden,56 and therefore, the Court held that Vermont was correct in con-
cluding that the foreign source of the dividends did not preclude a finding
of the required nexus with intrastate activities.5 7 The second factor consid-
ered by the Court was the significance of the form in which Mobil received
the income. The Court determined that the integration of the underlying
profit-producing enterprise was the controlling factor, not the form of the
investment.58 The Court treated dividend income from subsidiaries as
analogous to income earned by separate divisions of a unitary business
that would clearly meet the due process requirements of apportion-
ability.59 Although income is received in the form of dividends from le-
gally separate entities, the underlying economic realities of a unitary
business remain the same and the form of the income, therefore, should
not affect apportionability. 60 The Court stressed, however, that its decision
did not mean that all dividend income received by corporations operating
in interstate or foreign commerce would necessarily be subject to appor-
tionment. 6' If the activities of the payor corporation are unrelated to the
recipient's activities in the taxing state, due process might preclude appor-
tionment because no unitary business would exist. 62
The Court next addressed the commerce clause challenge and followed
its reasoning in Curry v. McCanless,63 holding that the commerce clause
does not require allocation of income from intangibles to a single state. 64
The Court reasoned that although the state of commercial domicile may
have the power to tax some of this income, that power is not exclusive
when the dividends reflect income earned from a unitary business, part of
which is conducted in another state. 65 Apportionability is the generally
54. 315 U.S. at 507-08.
55. 100 S. Ct. at 1232, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 522.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1233, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 523. "So long as dividends from subsidiaries and affili-
ates reflect profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise, those dividends are in-
come to the parent earned in a unitary business." Id.
59. Id, see Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920), discussed
at note 29 supra.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 1233, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 523.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1233-34, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 523-24.
63. 307 U.S. 357 (1939); see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 372-73.
65. 100 S. Ct. at 1236, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 526. Mobil contended that an apportioned tax
placed an undue burden on that income because New York, the state of its commercial
domicile, could tax the income in full. Mobil argued that the income, therefore, must be
allocated to New York. Although New York had not taxed the dividend income during the
years in question, the Court agreed with Mobil that actual multiple taxation need not be
shown in order to establish the unconstitutionality of Vermont's tax. Id. at 1235, 63 L. Ed.
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accepted method of allocating to a state its fair share of income for taxa-
tion purposes when the income bears a relation to benefits and protection
conferred by more than one state.66
In a dissenting opinion Justice Stevens objected to the majority's as-
sumption, inherent in its definition of a unitary business, that the divi-
dends from Mobil's subsidiaries and affiliates were analogous to the
income of operating divisions or branches of a single, legally integrated
business. 67 Justice Stevens supported his objection on three grounds.
First, the record showed a large number of corporations in which Mobil
owned minority interests that did not appear to be engaged in the petro-
leum business, but nonetheless were treated as part of the unitary busi-
ness.68 Secondly, the record did not disclose whether the dividends paid
even approximately represented the earnings of the payor corporations. 69
Finally, and in Justice Stevens's view, most importantly, Vermont made no
attempt to incorporate the sales, payroll, and property values of any of the
dividend payor corporations into its apportionment formula.70 Justice Ste-
vens insisted that if Mobil's world-wide petroleum enterprise was to be
defined as a unitary business, it should be consistently treated as such.71 If
income from payor corporations was to be included in the preapportion-
ment tax base as income from the unitary business, then the sales, payroll,
and property values of those corporations must also be included in the
denominator of the apportionment factors that represent the business's to-
tal sales, payroll, and property both within and without the taxing state.72
2d at 525. The absence of actual multiple taxation did, however, alter the nature of Mobil's
claim. Mobil sought to establish that in theory, the commerce clause requires allocation of
dividend income to a single state rather than apportionment among the states. Id; see notes
8-10 supra and accompanying text.
Mobil further argued that the risk of multiple taxation abroad created a burden on foreign
commerce, and thus foreign source income should be allocated to a single situs at home. Id.
at 1234, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 524. To support this argument, Mobil relied on Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The Court dismissed any analogy to Japan
Line because that decision involved ad valorem property taxes assessed directly upon instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce and because it focused on duplicative taxation at the inter-
national level. 100 S. Ct. at 1236-37, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 527. The Court concluded that Mobil's
argument was irrelevant because it focused on the effect of foreign taxation rather than
domestic taxation, which wa the only issue in the instant case. Id.
66. 100 S. Ct. at 1236, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 526.
67. Id. at 1242-43, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 534-35.
68. Id. at 1241 n.9, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 532-33 n.9.
69. Id. at 1243 & n.18, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 535 & n.18.
70. Id. at 1243, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 535. Mobil presented the argument in its reply brief that
the income of a taxable corporation must be determined by the taxing state on a combined
apportionment basis. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-6. This method would include the
income of subsidiaries and affiliates in Mobil's net income and eliminate intercorporate
transfers such as dividend income. The state would then have to include the subsidiaries'
and affiliates' sales, payroll, and property in the calculation of the apportionment formula.
The majority rejected this argument for three reasons: the court considered it an after-
thought; the record was insufficient to evaluate the proposal; and the argument challenged
the apportionment formula that the appellant had conceded was fair. 100 S. Ct. at 1233
n.15, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 523 n.15. For a discussion of combined apportionment, see Dexter,
supra note 41, at 419-20.
71. 100 S. Ct. at 1243, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 535.
72. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833(a) (1970 & Supp. 1980) for the statutory require-
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Failure to adopt this method inevitably overstated Vermont's proportion-
ate share of Mobil's income. 73
The majority did not decide whether combined apportionment would be
constitutionally required if a state sought to apportion the income of a
multicorporate enterprise. Instead, the Court assumed that the dividends
represented income earned by part of a unitary business because Mobil
failed to prove otherwise. 74 The Court implied that had this argument
been properly presented it would have been considered, 75 thus suggesting
that combined apportionment might be an acceptable alternative to Ver-
mont's apportionment method. The Court did not decide whether the in-
come attributed to Vermont by its apportionment formula was reasonably
related to Mobil's activities within Vermont. 76 Because Mobil's due proc-
ess argument focused on the lack of any nexus between the foreign subsidi-
ary dividend income and its activities conducted within Vermont, the
Court determined that Mobil was not challenging the fairness of Ver-
mont's apportionment formula.77 The Court may not have considered the
fact that implicit in Mobil's nexus argument was the contention that no
rational relation existed between any income from Mobil's foreign subsidi-
aries and Mobil's activities conducted in Vermont. Nonetheless, Mobil of-
fered no evidence to support that contention, relying instead solely on the
nexus argument. Further, because the issue was not raised, the Court did
not decide which elements would be necessary in a fair apportionment
formula.78 The Court emphasized, however, that accounting methods
used by businesses to allocate income to specific sources are not binding on
the states in determining the portion of income earned within its borders so
long as the activities within the taxing state are part of a unitary business. 79
III. CONCLUSION
In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes the Supreme Court
ment that the total sales, payroll, and property values are to be included in the denominator
of the apportionment factors.
73. 100 S. Ct. at 1243, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 535.
74. Id. 1233 n. 15, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 523 n.15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1230, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 519.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1237, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 528; Peters, Sup. Ct. 's Mobil Decision on Multistate
Income Apportionment Raises New Questions, 53 J. TAX. 36, 39 (1980).
79. The Court re-emphasized in the recent decision of Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109, 65 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1980). Exxon, an integrated petroleum com-
pany, is organized into three major functional departments, Exploration and Production,
Refining, and Marketing, but conducts only marketing activities in Wisconsin. It filed Wis-
consin income tax returns using separate geographical accounting that reflected only the
Wisconsin marketing operations. Wisconsin assessed taxes on Exxon's total income. In up-
holding the tax, the Court held that "a company's internal accounting techniques are not
binding on a State for tax purposes." Id. at 2119, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 80. The Court stated that
"[i]f a company is a unitary business, then a State may apply an apportionment formula to
the taxpayer's total income in order to obtain a 'rough approximation' of the corporate in-
come that is 'reasonably relatedto the activities conducted within the taxing State.'" Id. at
2120, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 81 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)).
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held that neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause prohibits
state taxation by apportionment of income earned from investments in af-
filiates and subsidiaries operating abroad. The Court based its decision on
defining Mobil's worldwide petroleum enterprise as a unitary business,
thereby expanding the scope of the unitary business principle to include
foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. The decision indicates that foreign
source income will be treated in the same manner as interstate income,
although several questions remain. The Court did not address the power
of the state of commercial domicile to tax dividends received by corpora-
tions doing business in interstate and foreign commerce. The Court did
not determine the elements of a fair apportionment formula. Further left
unanswered is the possibility of using combined apportionment as an al-
ternative to Vermont's method of apportionment. The Court emphasized,
however, that its decision did not mean that all dividend income is neces-
sarily apportionable. To preclude apportionment, the taxpayer must prove
that the dividends are paid by a subsidiary or affiliate whose activities are
not related to the activities in the taxing state. Mobil failed to prove this
fact, but instead relied on the argument that the income was received in
the form of dividends, paid by subsidiaries and affiliates abroad. Accord-
ing to the Court, neither the foreign source nor the form of the income
affected the underlying unitary nature of the enterprise.
Mary Clariday
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